This article examines two South Korean sites dedicated to the remembrance of Korean War-era civilian massacres, the Cheju 4.3 Peace Park and the Kŏch'ang Incident Memorial Park. Specifically, the article explores the sites' localized, victim-centric epistemology as one that counters nationalist discourses and narratives that privilege the state. While acknowledging that these sites offer a physical mnemonic space for challenging the hegemonic "June 25" (yugio) narrative, the author suggests that, in their narrow spatial and ideological orientation, these sites cumulatively fall short of offering a cohesive narrative of the politicidal, anti-Communist statebuilding project of which they are a consequence. Though of tremendous value in restoring victims' honor, critiquing human rights abuses of the Republic of Korea, and giving a voice to marginalized groups, these spaces fail to provide historical clarity to a distorted era of South Korea's past. In addressing this problematic, the article examines the role of family bereavement associations, narrative constructions, and the silencing of the National Guidance League Incident at these locations.
Introduction
For most of South Korea's post-civil war history, reconciling the conflict and its legacies has remained an elusive task. This is particularly true in the case of atrocities that were carried out by Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces during the Syngman Rhee government's campaign of politicide (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) : a widespread, systematic eradication of the South Korean indigenous political left. The process of democratic transition in South Korea afforded civil society groups and bereaved family associations (yujokhoe) the opportunity to successfully petition for a series of special acts, which culminated in the establishment of the Truth and impressive mnemonic work that these sites perform, a cohesive narrative linking the widespread phenomenon of state-led violence against civilians to the origins and nature of the antiCommunist South Korean national security state fails to emerge in these spaces. The article concludes with a reflection on the continuing power of anti-Communist ideology to shape the historical representation of South Korea's civil war period.
Theoretical and Historiographical Issues
South Korea's process of political transition was paralleled by an explosion of monuments and museums dedicated to honoring both soldiers and civilians killed in wars. Indeed, as South Korean scholar Chŏng Hogi's research has demonstrated, state construction of monuments accelerated considerably throughout the initial period of civilian governmentparticularly during the liberally oriented administrations of Kim Taejung and No Muhyŏn (Chŏng 2008, 195) . A myriad of explanations may be posited to explain this phenomenon, but two interrelated points strike me as most salient. The first concerns the rise of the "memory industry" around the globe. Theorists have argued that this phenomenon is rooted in the acceleration of history, which in turn has disrupted the equilibrium between past and present that stabilized previous societies. According to these critics, monumentalization, the explosion of museums, and the popularity of historical drama may all be read as responses to this malaise, as societies seek to anchor an increasingly unmoored past (Nora 1989; Jameson 1991; Huyssen 1995) . Meanwhile, in the case of post-authoritarian societies, greater political freedom has led nations to reconsider their recent pasts. A concern with justice has propelled these inquiries, as previously maligned groups have sought legal restitution, petitioned for truth and reconciliation commissions, and adopted universalist discourses of healing and human rights in an attempt to correct the wrongs of their still-present pasts-thus bringing to mind Milan Kundera's assertion that the "struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting" (Hinton and O'Neil 2009) . The global proliferation of so-called "dark tourism" has also played a role in this process, with specific sites dedicated to trauma integrated into nations' tourist infrastructures.
As a hyper-developed capitalist nation with a traumatic legacy of colonialism, internecine conflict, Cold War partition, and dictatorship, South Korea converges significantly with these global developments.
More critical to our present inquiry are processes endogenous to South Korea's democratic transition itself-specifically, shifts in cultural memory associated with the phenomenon of transitional justice. Ruti G. Teitel (2000) posits that transitional periods are ones in which a clear shift of political order toward greater liberalization is at stake. The quest for justice is central to these periods, as societies strive for novel political and normative frameworks to transcend previous periods of darkness. To Teitel, epistemic change is of profound importance, with history and the law conscripted into these developments. In times of political transition, previous epistemic "truth regimes" regarding a nation's past are frayed, and actors competehowever problematically-to forge a novel historical consensus appropriate to the society's future political development. The law integrally bonds with this process of historical reimagining.
As Teitel notes, the law provides a canonical language, lending official sanction to contested histories in a time of epistemic fluidity (Teitel 2000, 69-117) .
Unsurprisingly, therefore, South Korea's democratic transition was accompanied by legal and epistemic struggles pertaining to the nation's recent traumatic past. In this climate, bereaved families, civil society groups, and activists sought not only restitution and the restoration of honor, but also a revaluation of, and admission into, dominant national narratives. As historian Linda Lewis's research attests, this process was most thorough in the case of the Kwangju massacre, where an incident once officially portrayed as a Communist insurrection was reframed and co-opted by the state as a catalyst for the nation's painful democratic march (Lewis 2002 broader changes in social consciousness. These limitations include the major time lapse between these incidents and the establishment of the subsequent truth commissions, the continuing social and political power of anti-Communist conservatives, fissures within the aggrieved victims' communities, lack of punishments for the perpetrators, a shortage of financial restitution for the victims, a dearth of official documents, and a lack of subpoena power for the commissions to obtain documents or testimonies from government security institutions. The cumulative result has been a large gap between the number of official victims tallied and the number estimated to have been killed in this time period. Beyond these issues, Han and Chŏng point out, there have been epistemological contradictions within the logic of transitional justice itself. Han, for example, notes that the notion of "reconciliation," which is premised on moving beyond a painful past, mitigates punishment for perpetrators, therefore stymieing a proper acknowledgment of the past. Chŏng, meanwhile, raises a more profound problem, one with which my own work engages. The various commissions' focus on a specific legalistic category of institutionalized "victimhood" has effectively excluded larger causal questions concerning these massacres, such as questions about the legacies of the Japanese colonial era, national division, anti-Communist ideology, and exclusionary state policies. The social "truth" produced by these endeavors, therefore, has been myopic at best (Chŏng 2008; Han 2010) . Attempts at epistemic change have not, however, been confined to the legal realm, as the narrative modes of transitional justice have been complicit with the broader phenomenon of monumentalization that South Korea's political present has witnessed. By focusing on two sites that were both constituted by and constitutive of this dynamic process, I examine the implications and boundaries of these attempts at transitional justice in South Korea.
Beyond the issue of democratic transition, I engage with a broader shift in Korean War historiography. Indeed, contemporaneous with Korea's democratization has been a growing body of academic literature that explores the social and cultural legacies of the unending Korean conflict. Once dominated by American-centric geopolitical concerns (Stueck 1995) , Korean War scholarship has broadened its spatial and intellectual parameters to include questions of nationalism (Shin 2006) , state building (Cumings 1981 (Cumings , 1990 Pak 1995) have analyzed the sociological and epistemological modes of production within disparate sites dedicated to honoring victims of state massacres before and during the Korean War. Though offering a range of interpretations, recurrent themes throughout these analyses are the gaps between historical "truth" and its subsequent representation, the silences embedded in these sites, and the lingering power of state narratives to produce these distortions (Chŏng 2008; Han 2008; Kim M.-H. 2014; Kim and Kim 2014) . By exploring the causes and legacies of two episodes of mass state violence, the tensions between local and national practices of memory, and the shortcomings of epistemological strategies that privilege the episodic over the systematic, this article represents a modest contribution to the ongoing dialogue surrounding these important issues.
Finally, I should note that while the focus here is on two particular incidents south of the 38th parallel, the fundamental issues that I am dealing with are hardly isolated to the peninsula.
As anthropologist Heonik Kwon notes, the global Cold War was experienced by many decolonizing states in the form of mass death and a subsequent "political displacement of memories" by the political order's stifling bipolar logic (Kwon 2010, 6 overcome many of its legacies (Chen 2010, 118 ). Korea's contemporary status as a living monument to the Cold War's deformities renders it fertile ground for navigating these tragic complexities. By exploring the inherent political, social, and psychological dimensions of a history of systematic politicidal violence at these two sites, this article provides an illustration of the peninsula's capacity to illuminate deeper scholarly and global concerns.
Local Atrocities and the Question of Politicide
Though more subdued in recent years, the scholarly debates surrounding the Korean War have often resembled an epistemological minefield, with seemingly innocuous labels serving as signifiers for deeply held methodological and ideological convictions. One finds a similar phenomenon surrounding the issue of violence by the Republic of Korea (ROK) against civilians that transpired during South Korea's civil war. In the case of the events that transpired in Cheju on April 3, for example, a series of conflicting epithets-"riot" (p'oktong), "struggle" (hangjaeng), "uprising" (ponggi), "situation," (sat'ae), and "incident" (sagŏn)-are alternatively invoked in scholarship and public memory. When defining the deceased and the families of those killed during the period of civil war violence, a plethora of often mutually antagonistic descriptions proliferates. Indeed, depending on the context, the level of knowledge, or the ideological proclivity of the author, the same individual may be described as a "victim" (hŭisaengja, p'ihaeja) , an "impure" person (pulsunpunja), or a "Commie" (ppalgaengi). There are, in order words, deep connections between the residual social tensions that arose during the period of national division and the subsequent inability to adequately describe the traumatic events that were endemic to this era.
These internal divisions within South Korean society render it unlikely that a unified social memory of this bleak but formative period of the nation's history will emerge. However, South Korea's democratic transition and the advent of various special acts and truth commissions has led to a paradigm shift of sorts, as episodes once cavalierly dismissed as Communist revolts have now achieved official recognition as incidents of mass violence against civilians. In general terms, we may identify two salient features within this shift. The first is the increasing ubiquity of the term sagŏn (Kim D.-C. 2009 ).
3 The second, and perhaps more critical, component is the emphasis on the local, or singular, character of these atrocities. The result is that in the official mnemonic sphere, state violence during the civil war period is represented as a series of locally Over the three-day span, the Third Battalion of the Ninth Regiment raided the surrounding villages, killing 719 unarmed civilians and destroying the majority of houses and livestock.
Close to half of all those killed were women and the elderly, and young women were raped en masse (Chinsil Hwahae rŭl wihan Kwagŏsa chŏngni Wiwŏnhoe [hereafter, Chinsil Hwahaehoe] 2010a, 260).
The merits and limitations of this orientation are explored below. I would like to begin, however, with an interpretive intervention. While the locally specific character of the events ought not to be ignored, a compelling case exists that these events were part of a larger pattern of systematic violence that I identify here as a politicide of the South Korean political left in the context of a civil war. Genocide studies scholar Barbara Harff (2003) argues that politicides entail "the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents-or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities-that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group." Critical to the identification of politicides are the related issues of systematic duration and state intent.
Because episodes of transparent intent, such as the Holocaust or the Khmer Rouge killings, are extremely rare, we may deduce intent if (a) the perpetrators are agents of the state; (b) the level of violence from the state is disproportionate to that from the opposition; and (c) the state does not make a concerted effort to reduce the crimes (Harff 2003, 58-59) . The organized mass killings of armed, unarmed, real, and imagined leftists that transpired throughout South Korea's civil war fit this pattern. That the 4.3 and Kŏch'ang incidents were embedded within a larger trajectory of systematic state-on-society violence is beyond dispute. Let us first turn to the composition of the American-backed emerging South Korean national security state, and the destructive and highly political character of its counterinsurgency tactics. Headed by Syngman Rhee, the early ROK national security state was a coalition of anti-Communist independence activists, Japanesetrained security forces, and zealous anti-Communist youth groups often recruited from dispossessed families who had fled the 1946 North Korean land reform. Though rife with factions, the embryonic national security state was held together by an ideological commitment to anti-Communism and coalesced into its violent and political form during the events at Cheju.
Within the state, the principal groups responsible for the violence on the island were the police, the constabulary, and the Northwest Youth Association (Sŏbuk Ch'ŏngnyŏndan).
Critical to our understanding of the events at Cheju is the programmatic and overtly political character of the violence. Buttressed by the October 1948 quarantine of the island and the December 1948 National Security Law, the suppression forces were given carte blanche to accelerate the existing societal bifurcation, and they utilized their advantage in violent capabilities to advance anti-Communist power. The nature of the winter suppression campaign (November 1948 -March 1949 was illustrative of this process, as the island was spatially and ideologically divided and violently uprooted. For instance, head of the Cheju Constabulary Song
Yoch'an established a 5-kilometer safe zone of hamlets (extending from the ocean onto the mainland), and declared that anyone found beyond this shoreline perimeter would be deemed suspicious and could potentially be killed-thus simplifying the lines between friend and foe, and therefore between life and death (Tonga Ilbo, October 20, 1948) . These polarizing policies were synonymous with increasingly militant and exclusionary discursive practices within the suppression forces. As Cheju massacre researcher Kwŏn Kwisuk has demonstrated, by the time of the winter suppression campaign, any capacity to distinguish between the enemy and innocent villagers had all but disappeared within the minds of the suppression forces, consumed by the totalizing logic of "us" versus "them" that is typical of episodes of large-scale massacre or genocide (Kwŏn 2002, 180-185) . The numerous village massacres that transpired on Cheju followed this Manichean logic. To cite just one grim example, according to the findings of the were reported killed and 5,719 jailed, compared with only 3 dead and 8 injured on the side of government forces; meanwhile, suppression forces lost only 17 men during the entire winter campaign (Cheju 4.3 Sagŏn Chinsanghoe 2003, 295, 373) . This discrepancy takes on more significance when we consider the fact that, throughout the whole period of the guerilla uprising, the total number of poorly armed guerillas was estimated to have remained below five hundred people at one time-hence, an unnamed U.S. Army official's statement that the suppression campaign was a "program of mass slaughter."
5 The fall 1950-spring 1951 partisan warfare of which the Kŏch'ang Incident was a part represented a more credible threat to the Rhee government, as it came on the heels of a northern invasion, with anywhere between twenty and fifty thousand guerrillas estimated to be operating behind United Nations lines. 6 However, over the three-day killing spree at Kŏch'ang, resistance was absent. Indeed, while a total of ten police officers and right-wing youth groups members were killed in a December 5, 1950, guerrilla raid, Sinwŏn had been tranquil for two months, and the largest single killing occurred after all the villagers had been screened and interrogated (Chinsil Hwahaehoe 2010a, 260 carbon copy of the scorched-earth tactics employed on Cheju Island two and a half years prior (Chinsil Hwahaehoe 2010a, 254; Han, 2007, 43-48) . That we find the same cast of characters and methods carried out over a two-year duration indicates not only an absence of effort from the state to stem the tide of atrocities, but a sustained drive to entrench such practices.
Systematic Violence, Localized Memory
With an argument for the systematic and politicidal character of the Cheju and Kŏch'ang incidents now in place, we move to our discussion of each respective memorial park. Mirroring their parallel histories, the struggles for victims of these massacres to achieve recognition have been intertwined. Suppressed throughout the rule of Syngman Rhee (1948 Rhee ( -1960 , these issues came to light briefly during the Chang Myŏn period (1960) (1961) and feelings of empathy for the victims of this tragedy (Kang et al. 2011, 257-265) . Moreover, the sites function as locations for educational field trips, as well as places for official memorial functions within each community. Turning our attention to issues of epistemology and narrative, both sites lend credence to Susan Sontag's observation that "the memory of war . . . is mostly local" (Sontag 2003, 35) . This section focuses on each site's localized, victim-centric motif as an alternative to the state-led, anti-Communist "June 25" (yugio) narrative. Critical to note is that June 25 is not merely a date, but an epistemological field for demarcating the origins, character, and meaning of the conflict. As former TRCK member Kim Dong-Choon has noted, memorializing the conflict under the heading of "June 25"-the day that North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel-has allowed various South Korean governments to attribute all the war's causalities and devastation to a "Communist conspiracy" (D.-C. Kim 2009, 3-6) . Beyond this binary logic, an ideology of nationalism forged around state legitimacy has reigned supreme.
Legally and epistemologically estranged from the national narrative of the war period, it is unsurprising that victims' groups have sought an alternative framework for making sense of their communal trauma.
Though possessing notable differences in terms of scope and narrative strategies, the parks' two most prevalent shared features are an emphasis on the local character of the atrocities and a depiction of the state as predatory, rather than as the guardian of the Korean peoples (minjok). Through this narrative mode, each site actively works to demystify, though not necessarily to transcend, the June 25 narrative's power over historical production. The emphasis on the local is apparent immediately upon entering the Cheju 4.3 Peace Park, as the main gate is decorated with poetry by local authors dedicated to the massacre. Common among many of the pieces are an emphasis on the island's unique physical features, village life, and the tragedy's integration into these traditional facets of the Cheju identity. Likewise, upon entering Kŏch'ang Incident Memorial Park, the visitor is introduced to a poem titled "The Road to Sinwŏn" ("Sinwŏn kanŭn kil"), composed by Paek Hyŏngjin. Etched into a mock memorial stone (wiryŏngbi), the poem presents Sinwŏn as a community collectively defined by its trauma, stigmatization, and overcoming of these obstacles through duty and defiance. Written in a series of stanzas that depict Sinwŏn as a place that others close their eyes to and turn away from, that is isolated from the politics of the country's cities, and whose needs for redemption from the "ppalgaengi" ("red" or "commie") label are dismissed by the Seoul yangban (in this case, a euphemism for a wealthy elite), the poem is unified by a recurring motif that states: "If you say come, we will come; if you say go, we will go" (figure 1). The preceding analysis should not, however, be interpreted as a suggestion that the nation is absent from either site. Rather, the shift in orientation toward a localized, individual-centric memorialization allows each venue to confront critical elements of the state-centric nationalist hegemonic discourse-the most salient being the notion that the South Korean state is the protector of the citizenry. Indeed, in these sites, the state ceases to be portrayed as a modernizing force and bulwark against Communism, and instead is presented as a facilitator of murder, an incubator of national division, and a repressor of historical truth. On this subject, the Cheju 4. 
Embedded Silences, Fragmentation, and Residual Anti-Communism
It can therefore be stated that the importance of the memory work found within these sites transcends the laudable mission of restoring the honor of previously maligned victims of atrocities. Indeed, by becoming a permanent fixture within South Korea's mnemonic landscape, these sites may provide a useful safeguard against some of the more egregious features of the statist imagination that continues to dominate official memories of the peninsula's divisive history. However, an epistemological tragedy is at work at both of these sites: the ideological and spatial orientation that gives them their dynamism-a localized, victim-centric narrativenecessarily etiolates a critique of the systematic character of South Korean state violence outlined above. The result is a troubling paradox, as the two parks' shared mnemonic strategies produce a fragmented representation of the sustained state-on-society violence endemic to the civil war era.
The evidence and implications of the silences embedded in each site are manifest, and I will therefore focus on a few salient points. Most striking, perhaps, is that, despite their shared histories, neither site directly engages with the other in any significant fashion. At the Cheju park, for example, there is not a single mention of the Kŏch'ang Incident or any direct reference to any of the other civilian massacres that occurred in other regions of the country in the wake of the Cheju rebellion. Ensconced in its localized purview, there is little effort or need to consider the implications of Cheju providing a blueprint and testing ground for ROK counterinsurgency tactics, which spread throughout the southern half of the peninsula and manifested themselves more than two years later in Sinwŏn. At Kŏch'ang, the picture is more complicated, since within the Historical Education Museum there are two references to Cheju. However, in both cases, the connections between the two incidents are underdeveloped. For example, early in the exhibit, the September 1950. Instead of further pursuing the implications of this connection, however, the relationship between the events in Cheju and Kŏch'ang is reduced to that of the Ninth Regiment.
Consequently, a pedagogical opportunity is lost. By providing no historical account of the 4.3 Incident, the exhibit ignores the class-based and ideological political cleavages that were constitutive of the Cheju uprising and that structured the subsequent guerrilla partisan campaigns, which in turn led to the episode at Kŏch'ang. As an alternative, the visitor is provided with an interpretation of mass violence centered on the Ninth Regiment-one that omits both the broader practices of counterinsurgency and mass killings that were carried out south of the 38th parallel and the political character of the ROK anti-Communist state that formulated such strategies.
Again, we are encouraged to ponder the local over the national, and, therefore, the episodic over the sustained. and dragged him into the streets, where he was beaten to death (Kyŏnghyang Sinmun, May 12, 1960) . This incident garnered national attention, leading to numerous petitions and newspaper reports on other episodes of state-on-society violence that had happened during the Korean War.
For example, calls for investigations into the National Guidance League killings proliferated, while bereaved family members of victims executed without trial in Taegu Prison sought compensation and the punishment of perpetrators. In Cheju, meanwhile, the Paekchoilsonhoe victims association was formed, and its members demonstrated with radical students for historical restitution. These collective efforts culminated in brief National Assembly investigations (made public on June 24, 1960), which reported that thousands had been illegally killed during the war. The community of Sinwŏn, in other words, was at the vanguard of a much broader political movement and, indeed, consciously saw itself as being engaged in this political project (Hanguk Ilbo, June 21, 1960) . The reactionary terror against these activists in May and June 1961-recently dubbed the "Bereaved Family Incident" (Yujok Sagŏn)-was of a similarly national and highly politicized character (Chinsil Hwahaehoe 2010b, 77-83; Yi 2010) . To buttress his internal control and his image in the United States, Park Chung Hee labeled these activities as part of a North Korean Communist conspiracy and ordered the mass arrest of group leaders and the destruction of graves and monuments that had been erected the previous year. In the case of Kŏch'ang, seventeen people were arrested and convicted, and the community was forced to pay for the desecration of their family members' tombstones. In other towns throughout the country, police raided the offices and homes of bereaved family association members, destroying family records, and hauled leaders to jail, where they disappeared for months or years without explanation. In Cheju, some leaders fled to Japan, thus severing ties with family members who were forced to live with the stigma of the yŏnjwaje (guilt-by-association system).
10 Though both sites address the possibilities and ultimate tragedy of this era, these events are presented as isolated episodes of a community's struggle against an indifferent state. Similar to the presentation of the killings themselves, the systematic and historically constituted nature of these events is obscured from the viewer.
This estrangement does not exist merely between these two sites. Rather, it is a reflection of a broader epistemological insularity from the politicidal history to which these incidents belong. Evidence to support this argument may be recited ad nauseam, but it is perhaps best illustrated by examining the Cheju park's curious relationship to the National Guidance League twenty to one hundred thousand, making it perhaps the largest mass killing in Korean history.
Further, it was a deterritorialized affair, as 105 specific massacre sites have been identified, ranging as far north as Ch'unch'ŏn in Kangwŏn-do and all the way south to Sŏgwip'o in Cheju (Chinsil Hwahaehoe 2010a, 158-162) . When we consider its geographic diversity, its sustained manner, its connections to the ideological political project of the ROK government, and its intentionality, the National Guidance League Incident is perhaps the most transparent example of the systematic political violence that plagued this era.
Because thousands of Cheju residents were slaughtered during this campaign, it is unsurprising that these victims are honored throughout the Cheju 4.3 Peace Park. Here, the largest and most powerful exhibit is "Tombstone for the Missing" (Haengp'urim p'yosŏk) (figure 5). Individual gravestones for the 3,780 missing bodies lie throughout the section, the majority of which are dedicated to those presumably killed in mainland prisons during the 1950 summer extermination campaign. The exhibit's effect is further buttressed by a statue depicting lost souls attempting to cross the void into the afterlife (see figure 3) . Circling this construction are haunting letters from prisoners requesting food, medicine, and a yearning to return home. Minhwan's recent research has demonstrated, a similar strategic compromise was at work in the construction of the Cheju 4.3 Peace Park. Kim notes that artistic works and exhibits that either honored the deaths of Cheju guerrillas, or offered radical critiques of U.S. policies or those of the Syngman Rhee regime, were either discarded or altered into a less potent political form during the consultation process (Kim M.-H. 2014, 26-31) . In other words, historical representation at both parks was premised on a Faustian bargain of sorts, as victim groups partially submitted to the political and ideological hegemony of the anti-Communist leviathan. Han's chief concern is the parasitic effect that this history of coercion and compromise has had on the self-identity of the Sinwŏn's community. Beyond this valid concern, however, lurks a broader crisis surrounding the production of the Korean War past: the residual power of anti-Communism as a political and ideological project to shape and distort the representation of its own violent ascent to dominance. Indeed, an argument running through this article has been that the narrative tropes used in these parks reflect a deeper national, social, and communal memory toward these episodes. Seen from this perspective, the local and victim-centric epistemological frame common to both exhibits and their attendant fragmentations and silences may be interpreted as consequences of a complex sociopolitical process, in which groups' identities and frames of resistance were molded by and against the ideological and spatial demands of anti-Communism. The failure to forge a horizontal mnemonic solidarity surrounding the civil war politicide is therefore rendered intelligible. Marginalized, maligned, and coerced by successive anti-Communist dictatorships, victim groups were forced to insulate themselves from the ppalgaengi label by emphasizing the locally particular aspects of these episodes and the apolitical nature of their victims. The virtual silencing at both sites of the National Guidance League Incident-an episode of national trauma involving confessed Communists-is a predictable, albeit troubling, consequence of this process. In the realm of official monumentalization, reconciliation thus remains an unfinished process, as the inclusion of certain episodes of mass killing has been premised on a partial closing-off of spatial and epistemological avenues for exploring South Korea's still-opaque history of mass violence. As spaces that carry with them an aura of sacrosanct, objective, and unimpeachable historical truth (particularly with progressives), the risk is that these sites will enshrine this particular epistemological impasse into a new mode of hegemonic understanding of South Korea's era of civil war violence-one that
has not yet fully transcended its anti-Communist predecessor. The historian's relationship to these sites must therefore be critical and dialogical, with the aspiration that these parks will function as a starting point for visitors to further pursue the nation's still-unacknowledged history of politicide.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion sketched out the possibilities and pitfalls of dislodging the hegemony of the "June 25" anti-Communist narrative of the Korean War through a localized, victim-centric epistemological framework. Focusing on the Cheju and Kŏch'ang memorial parks, this article identified both the triumphs and shortcomings of this endeavor as embedded in these two sites. When compared to the distortions and bleakness of the recent authoritarian past, both locations undoubtedly provide a useful corrective. By acknowledging and enshrining the chronicle of wrongful deaths that plagued these communities, these sites restore a modicum of dignity to previously maligned souls and their families, who have had to endure decades of degradation and stigmatization. Further, by exposing state crimes that took place during the civil war era, they offer a rare vantage point from which to peer into a period of national trauma too often reduced to the intrigues of a predatory North Korea. In speaking to the maladies inherent to the ROK Army's counterinsurgency strategies, they compel visitors to reconsider the fundamental assumption that underpins South Korea's anti-Communist nationalism: that the state is the guardian of the people. However, this strategy's acumen manifests itself precisely at the point where it shows its limits. While sharing a similar history and mode of narration, neither site engages with the other, or with similar incidents of trauma that collectively form a history of systematic politicidal violence. Moreover, through offering an alternative to the stifling "June 25" narrative, this novel form of understanding was in part forged through compromise and subjugation to the demands of an anti-Communist ideological and political climate. The result is that the narrative and ideological frameworks of anti-Communism are not so much transcended as reinscribed into the narrative in a cryptic and residual form. Admittedly, with these thoughts, we are merely scratching the surface, and these criticisms should not be interpreted as a condemnation of the version of history that these sites present. It is therefore incumbent on scholars and activists alike to pursue a deeper inquiry into the nature and meaning of the South Korean state's history of systematic violence against its population in the civil war era. Regrettably, the current national mood of political reaction compromises the terrain for exploring and transcending the relationship between the nation's civil war past and its political present. For those interested in greater historical justice and clarity, this final point is an unpleasant, but necessary, one to ponder. Though the term sagŏn is typically translated into English as "incident," there is no direct English equivalent of the word. Its literal meaning is "an event that causes social problems and attracts social attention." 4 This article borrows extensively from the research completed by the National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Cheju April 3 Incident and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK). Considerable controversy has surrounded the activities of these institutions. The most significant criticisms in my view regard the limited scope and nature of these bodies. Work was hampered considerably by issues such as term limitations, the fact that victims had to petition for recognition, lack of subpoena power, the loss or destruction of evidence due to the passage of time or government interference, continuing social stigma and fear surrounding these issues, and lack of publicity, to name just a few. In my estimation, the cumulative effect of these problems renders the determination of an unvarnished objective "truth" concerning the numbers and precise nature of these atrocities improbable. The numbers I cite throughout the article are therefore estimates and reflect this issue. However, as the overall effect has been to understate the number of atrocities and their direct linkages to state policies, these shortcomings do not challenge my claim that they were systematic and sustained, and therefore politicidal. While I rely on the more detailed original Korean versions of these commissions' reports, a brief English-language synopsis of the TRCK's methods can be found in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (2009, 23-41 The number of guerrillas who operated in the southern provinces remains a matter of speculation. A South Korean government official estimated that close to fifty thousand guerrillas operated in South Chŏlla alone, while a National Assembly investigation in late October 1950 put the number at forty thousand. However, given the Rhee government's penchant for exaggerating enemy strength to justify military procurements and draconian policies, one needs to view these statistics with a modicum of suspicion. American sources put the number at a more modest twenty thousand, with as many as ten thousand coming from retreating Korean People's Army (KPA) forces (Chinsil Hwahaehoe 2010a, 264) . 7
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In the case of the 4.3 Incident, compensation was limited to those who were disabled or who had lost the ability to work and had no relatives. No financial restitution was given to the bereaved families from the Kŏch'ang Incident. 8
The Cheju 4.3 Peace Park is officially administered by the Cheju Special Self-Governing Province. The Kŏch'ang Incident Memorial Park is managed by the Kŏch'ang Massacre Management Office. 9
Since many of the bodies could not be recovered, or families avoided making claims out of shame, the actual number is estimated to be much higher. 10
Translated into English as either the "involvement system" or the "guilt-by-association system," the yŏnjwaje was a legal and social practice that discriminated against families whose relatives were accused Communists. Common practices included families being spied on, prevented from entering the civil service, or denied access to employment. See, for example, Cheju 4.3 Sagŏn Chinsanghoe (2003, (496) (497) (498) (499) (500) (501) (502) (503) (504) (505) (506) (507) (508) .
